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“After years of poststructuralist counteroffensive, humanities research still – perpetual-
ly and helplessly – falls into the trap of more or less syntagmatic models, where structure 
is still strong”, writes Roma Sendyka2. Even though the scholar writes about general 
tendencies in the humanities, one can attempt to contemplate her thoughts primarily 
in the context of narrative studies, which in their classical variant (e.g., Genette, Todorov, 
Barthes) were established upon the categorisation of narrative structures, or more spe-
cifi cally: linguistic, code-based structures. Despite clear attempts, articulated, for instan-
ce, by one of the most important representatives of cognitive narratology, Marie-Laure 
Ryan3, one cannot help but concede that the language focus remains a dominant force 
in this particular area of research. Obviously, this diagnosis does not mean that the post-
-classical turn in the approach to narrative did not change the position held by the focus 
on structure, or that the hegemonic conviction that narrativity is realized through certain 
textual structures has been abolished. However, one can doubt whether in the post-clas-
sical understanding of narrative that emerges from the achievements of the poststructu-
ralists, structure has been forgotten or if it simply changed its place, and representation 
still remains the basis of the narrative studies. No longer just a textual representation, 
yet it still uses signs, and because of that, discourse analysis/studies remains the main 
perspective of narrative studies. Patrick C. Hogan supports an analogous hypothesis 
by pointing out that studies on the category of temporality in the narrative are still mostly 
reduced to the linear, structural conceptualization of time as explicated by Genette4, 
which has its undisputed worth, but in a time of increasingly bolder and more transdi-
sciplinary offerings within the modern humanities, it demands at least a renegotiation. 
Obviously, it is essential to note that the post-classical turn enormously transformed 
our understanding of narrative and the narrative theorists keep pushing the borders 
of the fi eld, but despite that, some issues remain puzzling.
1 Project funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education as part of the National Programme for the 
Development of Humanities between 2014 and 2016.
2 R. Sendyka, Nowe przestrzenie humanistyki: pamięć, afekty i inne terytoria [in:] Pamięć i afekty, ed. Z. Budre-
wicz, R. Sendyka and R. Nycz, Warszawa 2014, p. 17.
3 M.-L. Ryan, Introduction, in: Narrative across Media: The Languages of Storytelling, ed. M.-L. Ryan, Lincoln 
2004, pp. 16–17. In this observation I remain in agreement with Patrick C. Hogan, who directly references 
the position taken by modern narratology. See: P.C. Hogan, Affective Narratology: The Emotional Structure 
of Stories, Nebraska 2011, pp. 1–2.
4 P.C. Hogan, op. cit., p. 3.
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As I have already mentioned, Marie-Laure Ryan advocates strongly against restricting 
narrativity studies to the medium of verbal texts, arguing that a narrative is constructed 
as a mental/cognitive script, which can be realized in many different media5. Ryan also 
clearly states that she does not mean to perceive narrative only as part of a linguistic 
paradigm. Instead, she says that an alternative for this codifi cation is considering the 
category as a certain kind of meaning6. Even though Ryan does not want to contradict 
the existence of a narrative, both on discourse and story levels, she focuses her attention 
upon the latter, from which she derives the determination of the meaning of a narrative. 
Ryan defi nes narrative as a cognitive construct or a mental image built by an interpreter 
with reference to the text7. Narrative is thus constructed in a double way: as a “textual 
act of representation” that relies on encoding its meaning, and as the abovementioned 
mental script which, as Ryan emphasises, does not generate narrative, but is itself con-
structed as a narrative8. Explaining the contradistinction of having narrativity and being 
a narrative, the scholar writes that certain cultural products and experiences can have 
a narrative potential and an ability to create mental scripts, while other “semiotic objects” 
are created with a clear intention of eliciting the construct9. Ryan’s contradistinction and 
her turn towards the recipient-constructor of a narrative opens new possibilities in narra-
tive studies, or rather in the studies of narrativity as a cognitive potentiality, by stepping 
outside the medium most predestined for it. This means that the medium is still very im-
portant for research on narrative (and I will show that it is strongly relevant especially in 
the fi eld of artistic practices based on so called wetware), but at the same time narration 
is a transmedia category. Even though Ryan’s specifi es function in the area that studies 
sign and linguistic representation as the most natural reference point for mental proces-
ses, she strongly emphasises the role of cognitive functions, and points towards mind 
studies, which are also supported by David Herman10. This research does not reduce 
the narrative to the dimension of the psychophysiology of perception, it combines both 
elements: media specifi city of complex artistic experiments (such as in bioartistic works) 
and narrative experience, which is usually based on some affective reactions of the body. 
This seems the proper way to think about narratives, allowing the expansion of areas 
open for narrative analysis, but such an expansion is never simple. The reason for this mi-
ght be that even in the latest approaches to narrative and narrativity only a few scholars 
attempt to go beyond the media products of culture, which easily undergo a narrative 
analysis. Considering narrative in relation to visual objects is not obvious, as proven 
by some recent attempts at defi ning narrative in this area through theories of gradation 
5 M.-L. Ryan, op.cit., p. 1.
6 Ibidem, p. 8.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, p. 9.
9 Ibidem.
10 D. Herman, Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind, Cambridge 2013, p. 12.
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or narrative modality11. It is not an easy task, especially when scholars do not want to 
constrain themselves to an analysis of the verbal layer, which appears in most audio-
-visual and multimedia works. Equating narrative with text offers, after all, an obvious 
way out of such analysis. Unfortunately, this is the path taken by most theorists who claim 
to be researching the narrative of media such as computer games or comic books12. 
A noticeable contemporary tendency to declare the need for transmedial narratology 
(Ryan)13, which embraces the fact of multimodality and translationality of modern media 
(Doloughan)14, is thus a laudable idea, but it forces us to ask new questions rather than 
formulate obvious diagnoses15. 
The judgemental resonance of the last two paragraphs is deliberate. The deeply-in-
grained and possibly not entirely wrong attachment that narratologists feel for semiotics 
(not to say – structuralism) is an adequate motivation for posing questions to narrati-
ve theory that arise from observations of modern artistic practices and philosophical 
deliberations. These questions concern issues such as whether a narrative that is not 
a representation by the means of language/text is possible, and whether a narrative, 
or even forms of narrativity that are understood to be a certain potentiality without any 
form of sign-representation are possible. These issues will not receive a fi nal answer 
in this chapter, but these questions do warrant serious consideration. They are closely 
linked to the propositions postulated in affect theory – a research area that is strongly 
expanding in modern humanities (including the narratological fi eld)16, which should pro-
ve useful in the development of critical research about narrative, especially in liminal 
cases. Affect theory also allows the inclusion of refl ections on corporeality in narratology, 
while preserving the defi nitional boundaries of narrative. 
The affective perspective is essential for refl ections on liminal cases of narrative, 
such as bioartistic narrtive, which is an uncommon subject of narrative analysis. The very 
important 2014 volume by Ryan and Thon, concerning the concept of the storyworld 
in different media17, does not offer the possibility of narrative study of these kinds 
of so called artistic practices. Visual art is not an obvious inclusion in a book on narrative 
because bio art constantly challenges the limits of representation. Also, bio art typically 
tends towards corporality, which often remains autonomous in relation to the rational, 
conscious analysis of narrative. In the case of a bio art work, it is diffi cult to speak 
11 W. Wolf, “Das Problem der Narrativität in Literatur, bildener Kunst und Musik: Ein Beitrag zu einer intermedi-
alen Erzähltheorie”, in: Erzähltheorie transgenersich, intermedial, interdisciplinär, ed. V. Nünnig, A. Nünnig, Tier 
2002, pp. 23–104.
12 J. Witek, Comic Books as History: The Narrative Art of Jack Jackson, Art Spiegelman, and Harvey Pekar, 
University Press of Mississippi, 1990.
13 M.-L. Ryan, op.cit.
14 F.J. Doloughan, Contemporary Narrative. Textual Production, Multimodality and Multiliteracies, London 2011, 
pp. 1–7.
15 Very promising is in this context is the book, New Narratives: Stories and Storytelling in the Digital Age, edited 
by Ruth Page and Brownen Thomas.
16 I am talking about Patrick C. Hogan’s book, Affective Narratology.
17 Storyworlds across Media: Toward a Media-Conscious Narratology, ed. M.-L. Ryan and J.-N. Thon, Lincoln 
2014.
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of any sort of content which would not be superimposed, and it is diffi cult to distinguish 
any formal or stylistic devices that might create a narrative, however, it would be unfruitful 
in this case to analyse bio art with traditional aesthetic tools. And despite the fact that one 
can look for useful research tools in the general fi eld of new media research (especially 
concerning electronic literature)18, or literary research, but in the cognitive context19, 
this particular kind of art, which is based on biotechnological procedures and philo-
sophical concepts operating on living organisms, actually requires us to create a new 
methodology, or at least to create different categorizations and defi nitions of narratolo-
gical concepts than those that already exist. This seems worth the risk, because the fi eld 
of bioartistic creation is an expanding area of modern artistic practice20 and it can bring 
interesting perspectives on research regarding nonverbal forms of narration. While only 
starting to recognize the possibility of conducting such a research, this study postulates 
the use of the affect theory, the category of experientiality (as understood by Monika 
Fludernik), focalization, and narratological conceptions of the storyworld. 
Narrativity and Affectivity
Isobel Armstrong writes that the most important axiom is the assumption that affects, 
which are experienced by both consciousness and body, transgress categories and be-
long “to mind and soma, straddling conscious and unconscious just as they straddle 
mind and physiology”21. In her interpretation of affectivity, Armstrong fi nds the possibility 
for breaking the thought/emotion dichotomy, and her conviction is strong enough to 
describe it as an axiom. The affective perspective, however, is not a coherent research 
fi eld, as it is developed in different ways by various academic disciplines, for which 
the only common point is the category of affect22. Affect itself is often interpreted in 
different, often confl icting ways. In principle, there are two points of disagreement that 
determine the difference between theorists of affectivity. The fi rst one concerns the re-
lations (identifi cation, similarity or difference) between affect and emotion, the second 
– the dispute about whether the affective experiences are precognitive, if they are 
an unconscious, automatic reaction of a biological organism, or are entangled with 
consciousness in a much more complicated relationship23. Close identifi cation of affects 
and emotions – in reference to neurobiological research – is recognized by Patrick C. 
Hogan, who suggests moving from formal narratology to research concerning emotions, 
18 Worth mentioning here are books by Monika Górska-Olesińska: Słowo w sieci. Elektroniczne dyskursy, Opole 
2010, classical work by Katherine Hayles: Writing Machines, Cambridge 2010, and the latest research by Kathie 
Inman Berens.
19 An interesting proposition in this area is introduced by Magdalena Rembowska-Płuciennik in her book, 
Poetyka intersubkiektywności. Kognitywistyczna teoria narracji a proza XX wieku, Toruń 2012, which I will use 
as reference in this article.
20 See S. Wilson, Information Arts: Intersections of Art, Science, and Technology, The MIT Press: Cambridge 
2002.
21 I. Armstrong, The Radical Aesthetic, Oxford 2000, p. 108.
22 G. Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind, Cambridge 2014, p. xiii.
23 B.T. Knudes and C. Stage, Global Media, Biopolitics and Affect: Politicizing Bodily Vulnerability, New York 
2015, pp. 14–15.
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which are considered as the basis of narratology24. Hogan notes that previous narrative 
research has mainly been based on searching the texts for language-based, rhetorical 
operations and their description(s). Instead, he proposes to direct our attention to events 
and actions of people that are based in an emotional system, as described by neuro-
cognitive research25. Hogan considers the narrative structures in stories to be a product 
of human emotional systems, which means that certain emotions (desire, fear, hate) 
can be developed as narrativized stories, which is incredibly important in the context 
of the history of literary genres such as epic poetry and romance. The underlying reason 
for distinctively narrative categories (e.g., time) is our emotional perception of them, 
not only of the form of their conventional presentation26. It is important to note that 
Hogan does not separate the emotional realm from discourse, despite thinking that 
emotions move outside the medium of language.
The perception of affects (understood here to be the same as emotions) as rationali-
zed forms of corporal experience helps Hogan to avoid the challenge of defi ning affects 
as body reactions that are beyond conscious control. This is the perspective postulated 
by many of its codifi ers, such as Brian Massumi, Nigel Thrift, Teresa Brennan, and Patricia 
Ticineto Clough. According to Clough, even though emotions and affects are connected, 
affectivity is a part of corporeality that escapes both rationalization and conscious con-
trol, and is – at least partly – independent from the sphere of refl ection (although indirec-
tly connected to it). Clough links this way of thinking about affects to the ideas of Deleuze 
and Guattari (philosophical thinking that can be traced back, in turn, to Bergson and 
Spinoza)27. On the other hand, Brian Massumi describes affectivity as an “incorporeal 
materialism” and refers to the vision of materiality postulated by Deleuze and Guattari, 
perceiving the body as space where affects are expressed in the form of a constant, dyna-
mic process of change. According to Massumi, affects are deeply corporeal experiences 
that engage the senses, the fl ow of energy, and biochemical processes28. The scholar 
also notes that, while emotions are narrated processes of action and reaction with certain 
functions and meanings, affects cannot be described unambiguously29. In his diagnosis, 
Massumi refers to an issue that is both extremely important and problematic for narra-
tive studies, one that Hogan (who prefers simple identifi cation of affects and emotions) 
does not broach. According to the theorists of affectivity understood in a precognitive 
manner, affects are something beyond narrative because they are non-linguistic and 
non-linear. As Tomasz Dalasiński sums it up, “Affects transport thinking about the subject 
from a narrative-discursive perspective to a post-narrative, or even a post-discursive one, 
24 P.C. Hogan, op.cit., p. 7.
25 Ibidem, p. 2.
26 Ibidem, p. 4.
27 The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, ed. P.T. Clough and J. Halley, Durham 2007, pp. 1–2. 
28 B. Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Durham 2002, p. 27.
29 Ibidem, p. 11.
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where the key role is played not by the development of ‘self’, but by the constantly chan-
ging present”30.
Sendyka, quoting Gumbrecht’s opinion on the “pursuit of non-narrative forms”31, 
also fi nds these “non-narrative forms” in affects that reside outside of language32, in the 
“post-semiotic” and “post-mimetic” space33. According to her, semantics and semiotic 
are thus a misguided route of affective analysis34. These statements, even if formulated 
too hastily, expose a clear tendency to think of narrative in the context of language, line-
arity, sign theory and representation – even though the last one is a much more complex 
issue. The crucial question when considering the application of the affective perspective 
to narrative studies is: can this be possible? A compromise could be achieved with the 
concepts of affectivity that do not place it exclusively in a pre-cognitive space. I shall 
discuss this further in the following sections of this study, but still, I am of the opinion that 
the radical question about the possibility of creating a narrative outside of discourse, 
language, and any form of mimetic representation remains both open and incredibly 
important.
According to Dalasiński, “Hybridity of affectivity means that the artefacts cannot be 
defi ned with full responsibility as either conscious or unconscious, biological (corporeal) 
or social (civilisational and cultural), material or immaterial etc. phenomena, because 
affects work to abolish these dichotomies”35. In his ideas, Dalasiński confi rms Isobel 
Armstrong’s discussion of affects as negotiable, fl uid categories. Britta Timm Knudsen 
and Carsten Stage correctly set apart a group of female scholars associated with femi-
nism and posthumanism (e.g., Judith Butler, Margaret Wetherell, and Lisa Blackman) 
who are sympathetic to the vision of affectivity that does not decide where the affects 
should be assigned36. However, the scholars themselves have proposed a typology of 
affects that joins both perspectives, confronting affect with the category of discourse. 
The postulated typology is based on distinguishing three types of affect: pre-discursive, 
partly discursive and partly non-discursive. The fi rst category contains the affective expe-
rience excluded from discourse, but only if we understand discourse as a purely linguistic 
category, and affect as something that cannot be put into words. These scholars reject 
the defi nition of affects as pre-cognitive experiences because (as they state when discus-
sing partly discursive affects) it is not possible to make a clear distinction between “bo-
dily non-representational living and conscious representational cognition, because these 
dimensions constantly intertwine”37. They state this in spite of their support of Thrift’s 
30 T. Dalasiński, Ludzkie, arcy(nie)ludzkie. Efekt afektu i aktualność podmiotu drugiej nowoczesności [in:] Pamięć 
i afekty, op. cit., pp. 108–109.
31 R. Sendyka, op.cit., p. 16.
32 Ibidem, p. 15.
33 Ibidem, p. 17.
34 Ibidem, p. 15.
35 T. Dalasiński, op.cit, p. 108.
36 B.T. Knudsen, C. Stage, op.cit., p. 15.
37 Ibidem, p. 19.
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and Massumi’s concepts which, according to them, correctly contest representatio-
nalism-based theories. The third category is crucial and it means that discourse plays 
a modal role in the production of affects. In other words, even though affects are never 
free from a discursive fi lter, they are never fully dependent. Our cognition – the scholars 
follow here a well-known observation made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty – is generated 
on the basis of the chiasmus between a perception of world from the inside of the body 
and a perception from the outside (i.e., through every existing cultural convention and 
scheme)38.
An interesting perspective concerning this issue, complementary to Knudsen’s and 
Stage’s typology, is introduced by Natika Newton—namely, the scholar has noted that 
the basic problem arising from the application of the category of representations in 
cognitive theory is associated with the way these representations are defi ned: as sta-
tic outlines, symbols taking the form of neural groups. Meanwhile, in cognitive pro-
cesses, of crucial importance are dynamic, spontaneous acts that go beyond establi-
shed patterns of behavior and perception; therefore, Newton proposes the introduction 
of the category of mental activities that could replace static representations39. Accor-
ding to this approach, “[c]ontent is delivered by the context and the purpose of repre-
sentative activity, which is not packed in a ready-to-apply manner in neural patterns 
recruited within representative activity”40, and this approach is related by the author to 
an ascertainment by Merleau-Ponty, who believed that representation could not be inde-
pendent from an entire sequence of behaviors, as it does not have any actual meaning 
for the body. According to Newton representation is an activity (and a dynamic one 
at that), which does not express any abstract relationship between separate or static ob-
jects. It also applies to thought processes, during which we “manipulate” the objects obse-
rved; therefore, Newton maintains that representations and images are modal in nature. 
This, in turn, has the following meaning: “Many people think of all images as visual, 
but there are excellent reasons to expand the term to include representations of all 
sensory, motor, proprioceptive, and affective states. ... In short, we can imagine any-
thing we can experience”41. Association of mental imagery with actions and experien-
ces, which is an in-depth redefi nition of the category of representations in cognitive 
processes, also involves affective reactions based on experience and volatility. Newton 
proves that affectivity can operate in the area of representation, but not one understood 
as static, abstract mental scripts. Although Knudsen and Stage’s typology is not expla-
ined on the basis of the theory of embodied cognition, it gains all the more importance 
in the face of Newton’s conclusions.
In general, I agree with the concept postulated by Knudsen and Stage, and it 
is the starting point for my thinking about affects in the context of bio art. It is also 
38 Ibidem, pp 20-21.
39 N. Newton, “Problem reprezentacji w teoriach poznania ucieleśnionego [Representation in Theories of Embo-
died Cognition]”, AVANT, 2012, No. 3., p. 71.
40 Ibidem, p. 76.
41 Ibidem, p. 79.
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helpful in including the affective perspective into narrative studies, as in this interpreta-
tion, affectivity is never entirely free from discursive baggage. However, with help from 
a few artistic projects, I would like to consider also whether we are able to distinguish 
a purely biological affective experience that, in itself, can contain narrative potential and 
convince us to project stories (i.e., to construct mental representations that are not only 
mimetic projections of observed universes).
Genetic Manipulations, Tissue-cell Experiments and Biometrics: 
The Narratives of Bio Art
I situate bio art among so-called new media art, even though it is more out of an 
attempt to create a rough categorization than out of a conviction that this is the correct 
place. Bio art is not a homogenous area of artistic pursuits, and within its borders one 
can fi nd at least a few leading trends, such as: transgenic art, in vivo and in vitro (per-
formed on living organisms and on tissues or cells isolated from living organisms and 
modifi ed outside of them), DNA art42, or what I describe in my research as biometric art, 
by which I mean art based on the procedures of measuring functions of living organisms. 
These projects are realized as sculptures, installations, various forms of imaging, archi-
tectonical and relational projects.
Polish scholar of bio art, Monika Bakke, also brings attention to problematic aspects 
of her categorization, however, correctly deciding that “the common feature of various 
realisation in this fi eld is the fact that they arise from the interest in the phenomenon 
of life in context of biology and biotechnology”43. Also important is the individual cre-
ative process based on inspiration, understood in a manner derived from the roman-
ticism, which has been replaced in bio art by complicated technological procedures, 
and the art’s character is usually processual (i.e., the living organism as an art object is 
constantly developing) and this has abolished the dichotomy between art work and living 
organism, which traditionally is only art’s recipient. The recipient status is negotiated 
in most bio art projects, not only because of their affi nity with modernistic theory and 
practice, but because of the very matter of artistic endeavours.
Bio art acts are numerous enough that it would be diffi cult to make even a basic 
list. The Tissue Culture and Art Project group’s Semi-Living Worry Dolls is perceived as 
one of the more important works in this art movement. It is inspired by so-called “worry 
dolls” from Guatemala, which – even though they currently are a product for tourists 
– were once a part of a traditional belief system: they allowed children to give away their 
concerns and worries. In the group’s interpretation, the dolls, created out of living cells 
grown in laboratories, tell stories about life and dying (in contact with the non-hermetic 
environment the “dolls” die), which emphasises the way the modern world has moved 
the boundaries between natural and artifi cial, alive and dead44. Especially intriguing 
42 See: M. Bakke, Biotransfi guracje. Sztuka i estetyka posthumanizmu, Poznań 2010, pp. 146–180.
43 Ibidem, p. 146.
44 See: https://dublin.sciencegallery.com/visceral/semi-living-worry-dolls/ [access: 11.08.2015].
„Tekstualia” No. 1 (3) 2017 69
are projects by Anna Dumitriu, and in the context of narrativity studies the most important 
one seems to be The Romantic Disease: An Artistic Investigation of Tuberculosis, which 
consists of sculptures and installations made out of historical objects that were subjected 
to the bacteria that causes tuberculosis. The goal of this project is to tell an alternative 
history of tuberculosis, not from the perspective of the diseased people, but through 
the objects and the behaviour of microorganisms that spread and cause the disease45. 
The project in question would fi t perfectly into a post-antropocentric narratology stu-
dies perspective46, which I postulate in the last part of this article. Using both projects 
as examples, one can see the phenomenon that I would like to call “re-narrativization”, 
by which I mean media appropriation, transmission and remoulding of certain narratives 
enrooted in culture – functioning as plot, plot threads and mythological motives, as well 
as religious beliefs and literature. This process is of great importance in the context of bio 
art, as this appropriation entails changes in the very “matter of narrative”, characterised 
by the medium of the body. Elements of Guatemalan belief and notes on tuberculosis 
have been transformed into their corporeal, biological variants that function on the affec-
tive level not only on the recipient’s side, but also on the side of the artistic work. Stories 
that possessed a doubtlessly linguistic form were transformed into language that can 
barely be called a language, as it functions beyond the area of semiotic representation. 
Another research perspective, postulated by Monika Bakke, writes bio art into a so-
cial context: “This is how bio art fi ts into the area of various narratives we create, fascina-
ted by biological breakthroughs and the possibilities of biotechnology”47, which allows 
non-specialists to understand their meaning, at least in part. Thus, bio art can also be 
analysed as a narrative translation of areas of knowledge and activities that are not 
generally narrative. Furthermore, in the case of recent conceptual and critical art trends, 
this narrative potential is not located within the artistic object itself, but within its context 
(i.e., political and social meaning). The whole does not create a grand modernist narra-
tive, but its hybrid, a performative narrative, although the analysis of the socio-political 
context is obviously one of the possible methods of studying narrative in bio art48.
However, in this article I would like to consider some different ways of thinking about 
narrative and narrativity in bio art and turn to works by the Turkish artist, Pinar Yoldas, 
and to pieces by Philipe Rahm and Jean-Jacques Decosterd, described as “physiological 
45 ‘The Romantic Disease: An Artistic Investigation of Tuberculosis’ by Anna Dumitriu, http://www.wellcome.
ac.uk/News/2014/WTP055336.htm [access: 11.08.2015].
46 I have not yet encountered this term in scholarly works, but it is important to note here that David Herman is 
also leaning towards transgressing the anthropocentric boundaries in narrative studies, calling this perspective 
a “narratology beyond the Human”. In his works, Herman is looking for a place for the human “me” in a space 
inhabited by different life forms; see. D. Herman, “Narratology Beyond the Human”, Diegesis 3. Interdisziplinäres 
E-Journal für Erzählforschung, no 2/2014, https://www.diegesis.uni-wuppertal.de/index.php/diegesis/article/
view/165/218 [access: 19.09.2015].
47 M. Bakke, op. cit., p. 146.
48 Just as important could be relating it to the argument on biopolitics and biomedicalizing (Nikolas Rose, Ro-
berto Esposito), or maybe turn to media studies for works on (post)digital painting (B. Bolt) or on the concept of 
body as a picture (Mark B.N. Hansen, 2004).
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architecture”. These works are most likely less known to than the abovementioned fl ag-
ship bio art pieces.
Pinar Yoldas and Alternative Tales of Evolution49
Pinar Yoldas creates her works in the United States, and that is where she graduated 
from university with a project called Fabula (Fables from a Posthuman World)50, bearing 
a title that is indicative of her artistic pursuits as a whole. Just as the title proclaims, most 
of her projects are tales of posthuman worlds and beings51, although they are not written 
down, but created – as installations and certain kinds of sculptures – made out of organic 
matter: tissue grown in a laboratory, silicon, and glass. The main idea behind her works 
is speculative biology: presenting a vision of an alternative evolution, a speculation abo-
ut how the world and the species living in it might look like if the evolutionary rules that 
have become quite disturbed nowadays, were to stop working. Yoldas has created over 
a dozen projects related to this concept. I will focus on two of them – Fabula: Origins 
of Species (2008) and After Evolution (2013). These projects concentrate on creating 
alternative biological worlds in the context of the natural world. Bio art in general, and 
Pinar Yoldas’ projects in particular, deal with very important matter of dependence be-
tween media (and in this particular context – the body as a medium) and narrativity52.
As Yoldas herself describes it, Fabula: Origins of Species is a cycle of drawings, 
responsive sculptures placed in a lab jars and photographs that show the development 
of new life forms that emerge as a result of breakthroughs in biotechnology, medicine 
and engineering, which cause the transformation of natural bodies53. Due to these chan-
ges, the world in Yoldas’s visions is being increasingly settled by mutants, symbionts and 
hybrids. It is diffi cult to judge whether this is a diagnosis of the current state of affairs 
or a prediction concerning a near future, however, from the recipient’s perspective it is 
an alternative vision of everyday reality. Characters (some of them entirely fi ctitious, 
others a non-standard composite of elements that exist in nature) and universes with 
their own particular physical parameters were created in the project (e.g., water spaces, 
or so-called “red fabula”, a universe submerged in a red liquid). One of the most inte-
resting sculptures of both the project and Yoldas’ creative output in general is Breathing 
Brain – a vision of a creature that breathes with its brain, placed on the outside of its 
skull, instead of with its lungs.
49 Writing about the relationships of narrative refl ection with the theory of evolution and the evolutionary ap-
proach to cultural texts, it is also worth remembering the discourses that laid the foundations for this method-
ological meeting, such as Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and 
Nineteenth-Century Fiction (1983), Walter Burkert’s Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions 
(1996), as well as Brian Boyd’s On Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (2009).
50 See: http://pinaryoldas.info/pinaryoldas_cv_march2014.pdf [access: 12.08.2015].
51 Posthumanism is understood here not as the idea of improving human beings and extending their capabilities 
(transhumanism), but as an attempt to move past the antropocentric paradigm, where only the human being 
is distinguished.
52 More detailed studies of this media conditioning are unfortunately outside to scope of this article, but shall be 
an important issue for a separate paper.
53 See: http://pinaryoldas.info/Fabula/ [access: 12.08.2015].
„Tekstualia” No. 1 (3) 2017 71
The After Evolution project is constructed in an analogous manner, consisting of dra-
wings, photos and – most interestingly – sculptures, through which Yoldas has created 
a post-evolutionary world, where Darwinian evolution has ceased to matter54. There are 
plants placed in their microhabitats and creatures who seemingly belong to one species, 
which, however, does not resemble humans or any known animal species. They are 
all placed in adequate conditions – submerged in a special fl uid, exposed to the light, 
intentionally placed around the exposition – so that one can recognize how they remain 
in a sort of relation to each other. The most interesting installation for me is one that 
depicts the moment of birth of one the creatures. As we cannot see its mother, and it is 
entwined with red “vines” reminiscent of an umbilical cord, one can suppose that this is 
a case of self-birthing, creatio ex nihilo.
Especially interesting in the analysis of these two projects seems to be the cate-
gory of experientiality postulated by Monika Fludernik, as well as the concept of sto-
ryworld and the possible worlds theory formulated by Marie-Laure Ryan. The concept 
of experientiality is an essential part of the “natural” narratology project. “Natural” 
narratology has been used by Fludernik to oppose passive, static theories of narrative 
that rely on a description of elements. While postulating a dynamic, processual vision 
of a narrative, Fludernik sees narrativity to be an effect of the process of narrativization, 
by which she means creating narratives through cognitive functions and tools in the mind 
of the recipient that relate to everyday experiences of the real world 55. For this process 
to take place, a “mediatisation through consciousness” is necessary, and it is essential 
on different levels of narrative creation: for the narrator as well as for the recipient’s 
interpretation56. Magdalena Rembowska-Płuciennik describes this aspect of Fludernik’s 
theory as a “phenomenal change”. The basis of this change is an abandonment of 
conceptualising consciousness as something that has its own textual representations, 
and a reconception of it as a medium in the cognitive processes of both the artist and 
the recipient of the narrative57. Because of that, according to Fludernik, the narrative 
does not have to be determined by the plot, understood as a sequence of causally 
connected events. After all, poetry, which is not required to contain a plot, can evoke 
a much more important narrative experience than a report, even when the report is 
written according to strict guidelines of sequencing58. This statement stays true to David 
Herman’s belief that the narrative is a cognitive instrument that gives meaning to every 
action59.
In the light of Fludernik’s categorisation, Yoldas’ works have enormous narrati-
ve potential because the affective-emotional experiences that activate the recipient 
are especially persuasive in creating a tale around them by stimulating our cognitive 
54 See: https://vimeo.com/78141741 [access: 12.08.2015].
55 M. Fludernik, Toward a Natural Narratology, London 1996, p. 15.
56 Ibidem, p. 278.
57 M. Rembowska-Płuciennik, op. cit., p. 83.
58 Ibidem, p. 16.
59 D. Herman, Storytelling, op. cit., p. 228–240.
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apparatus. Fludernik writes, “All experience is therefore stored as emotionally charged 
remembrance, and it is reproduced in narrative form because it was memorable, fun-
ny, scary, or exciting”60. In light of Yoldas’ projects, the stimuli that initiate the process 
of narrativization seem to be especially intense. Obviously, they also strongly refer to 
the experiences of real life, which are essential in creating a narrative through a media-
ted consciousness61. As Justyna Tabaszewska writes, this is because: “The affect’s func-
tion is not only to report on certain emotions, but also to activate them, ensuring they are 
experienced and felt”62. However, the key issue here remains not the abstract thesis abo-
ut the attractiveness of certain stimuli, but the pragmatics of narrative, often emphasised 
by Rembowska-Płuciennik, who assumes that narrative has an informative function63. 
In the case of Yoldas, this information is especially intense, engaging the preceptor’s 
consciousness, and relating to their most intimate experiences. When confronted with 
Yoldas’s projects, the recipient will probably not create a coherent plot, but it is possible 
that the strong perceptive experience will elicit a more intense process of narrativiza-
tion than might emerge by trying to determine the cause and effects of events. Thus, 
we remain in the area of narrative potentiality, as the narrative created in this context can 
be expanded and built on stronger cognitive experiences than the kind of narrative that 
might be based on decoding evident narrative elements in a text or some other narrative 
object.
In contrast, Ryan’s storyworld is a world well-adjusted for story to appear and exist 
in. It is a constantly dynamic model of ever-changing events and situations, represen-
ted in the recipient’s mind64. It possesses its own parameters: characters, setting, laws 
of physics, social and moral rules, and events65. Events are also closely linked to the plot 
and this particular connection between the narrative and the category of plot makes it 
diffi cult to apply the concept of storyworld to media other than literature (and even here, 
almost exclusively, the novel) and fi lm, even though the very idea of Ryan’s work is to 
propose a transmedial perspective. Ryan also asserts that the storyworld consists of extra- 
and intra-diegetic elements: parts of narrative that evidently belong to the world created 
in the story or belong there only in part, or stay outside of it while retaining infl uence66. 
Ryan does not provide many examples of unconventional realizations of the storyworld 
idea, deciding to stay mostly within the textual universe. Meanwhile, application of this 
idea to a space-time created out of biological materials, partially in a laboratory, could 
lead to interesting results. The universes within Yoldas’s projects do not have appointed, 
general rules according to which they function so that the reader needs to develop 
60 Ibidem, p. 21.
61 Ibidem, p. 9.
62 J. Tabaszewska, Afektywne interpretacje. Afekt w koncepcjach Jill Bennett oraz Valerie Walkerdine [in:] Pamięć 
i afekty, op. cit., p. 218.
63 M. Rembowska-Płuciennik, op. cit., pp. 98–102.
64 M.-L. Ryan and J.-N. Thon, op. cit., p. 33.
65 Ibidem, pp. 34–37
66 Ibidem, pp. 37–38.
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further. Rather, Yoldas presents them as a kind of theoretical framework with assumptions 
concerning everyday experiences. Although a world, there is not a space closed for ima-
gination, at the same time it is not only designed, but also artifi cially created. Within this 
kind of a storyworld, according to the criteria listed above, it is possible to think of this 
category in reference to the Turkish artist’s projects, as it has its own laws of physics, bio-
logically-formed characters, rules dependent on the matter used to create it, and – be-
cause of the cognitive operations – a recipient with enough competence can establish its 
social and moral rules. Narrativity generated in such a storyworld is not set out by written 
rules and described elements, but is designed in such a way that it can initiate a narrative 
through intense stimuli that provoke the cognitive apparatus, such as: confrontation with 
physical corporeality “presented” before us, with shapes that make us uncomfortable, 
or though simulating temporality not with verbal indicators of sequencing, but through 
change of states dependant on the laws of the world created and our impressions. 
In a storyworld built in such a way, based on affective stimulation, some of the indicators 
assigned to this category are redefi ned or negotiated, not because this distinction is 
wrong, but due to their material specifi cations. After all, this is a world about which the 
recipient does not speculate based on textual indicators, but one which they literally have 
in front of their eyes and, therefore, can be supplemented with additional details. Such 
a physically existing world seems predestined to much larger degree than the traditional 
textual world for stories to appear in it. This world is no longer told in words, represented, 
but it is a world that actually exists – one that is experienced and is a reference point for 
mental constructs. Obviously, this is not about this gradation, but about pointing out that 
the storyworld can also have its own exemplifi cations in realizations that are a challenge 
for narratology.
By transcending the textual matter while creating at the same time a certain kind 
of a storyworld, Yoldas’ universe designs also fulfi l the idea of possible worlds, directly 
implanted into narratology by Marie-Laure Ryan in 199267, although the usefulness of this 
concept was signalled earlier by Umberto Eco, Thomas Pavel, Lubomir Doležel68. Distin-
guishing both categories – storyworld and possible worlds – is especially important in the 
context of the Turkish artist’s projects, as on one hand they highlight the potential narrati-
vity of the created universes, and on the other hand they make their ontological wholeness 
apparent (possible worlds are fi rst and foremost a philosophical concept), which seems 
to strengthen and actualize the story potential of those worlds. It is important to note here 
that using possible worlds theory in narrative studies has been criticized by philosophers 
(such as Ruth Ronen) who perceive literary universes as unique in this ontological con-
cept69. Moving past the equation of narrative with linguistic matter can thus bring about 
an even more interesting application of possible worlds theory to narrative studies.
67 Ibidem, Possible Worlds, Artifi cial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory, Bloomington 1992.
68 M.-L. Ryan, “Possible-Worlds Theory”, in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, ed. D. Herman, 
M. Jahn, M.-L. Ryan, London 2005, p. 446.
69 Ibidem, p. 446.
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The theory of possible worlds, in line with their philosophical defi nition, are defi -
ned with reference to the actual world, which is the prime element of reality and, 
depending on interpretation, is either the one where the occupant is placed (Lewis), 
or the one that exists as an autonomous from others, where one remains an independent 
being (Rescher). As Ryan notes, what has become essential for literature it is the issue 
of the truthfulness of certain statements and laws of logic that maintain a relation to 
the fi ctional worlds in stories70. The consequence of these refl ections is an agreement 
– as postulated by Ryan and Kendall Walton – that when a reader reconstructs the fi c-
tional world, they fi ll in the blanks and assume a certain similarity to the world of expe-
rienced reality. This means that the possible world becomes an actual world, an essential 
element of reality71. Moreover, the possibility of the fi ctional world makes it possible for 
it to move past the boundaries of its own textuality due to its basis in the real universe72. 
Such a possible world becomes a complete modal system and a comprehensive ontolo-
gical being, at least in relation to the recipient’s experience, in this case – the reader’s 
experience73.
Umberto Eco distinguished three kinds of possible worlds74, two of which describe 
the universes created by Yoldas. The fi rst one is invented and created by the author, 
its elements are presented in the plot as actual, while the second one is believed in 
and imagined by the reader during the act of reading, and which is either confi rmed 
or negated in the course of the narrative sequence. The third kind of possible world is 
one imagined by a character in the universe, but in case of Yoldas’ works we can only 
assume the existence of this third type, as it is diffi cult to explicitly confi rm75. The criteria 
defi ning the status of possible worlds are their possibility and accessibility in relation 
to the real world, and they depend not only on the laws of logic, but also on physics 
and material causality76. These criteria help to evaluate whether a world constructed in 
a particular way could actually exist.
This short description of the possible worlds concept helps to specify that in Pinar 
Yoldas’ projects we encounter a particular kind of universe creation. It is not a textual 
world, or even an explicitly fi ctional one, but rather a kind of alternate speculation on 
reality. It befi ts the real world in such a way that is becomes a variation and the possibility 
of its existence is confi rmed by the presence of scientifi c data and other predictive para-
textual information. Thus, it possesses – I shall emphasize – its own parameters and laws 
of physics, which are not only theoretical indicators, but also directly act to determine 
the created world and the creatures that exist in it. The world might have been imagined 
by the author, but those notions have been continuously verifi ed by the biotechnological 
70 Ibidem, p. 448.
71 Ibidem, p. 447.
72 Ibidem.
73 Ibidem.
74 U. Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Text, Bloomington 1984, p. 246.
75 Ibidem.
76 M.-L. Ryan, “Possible-Worlds”, op. cit., pp. 448–449.
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procedures, which are supposed to introduce the optimal data. This world immediately 
goes from possibility to actuality on the authorial construct level, but this does not mean 
that it does not leave any place for the recipient. When confronted with the Turkish artist’s 
projects, we are still being invited to fi ll in the blanks, to relate them to our everyday expe-
riences. It almost seems that because of the matter in which the universes are realised, 
they initiate narrative in a much more intense manner, engaging the senses which remain 
rather passive in the process of reading, such as touch. Moreover, although the project 
leaves little for the recipient to imagine, when it comes to the creation of space-time, 
it seems that they invite the recipient in a much more intense manner to fi ll it with stories 
connecting these elements into a coherent whole, thus confronting them with reality. 
On one hand, it is an autonomous world, which exists (materially and physically) inde-
pendent of interpretation, while on the other hand, it has a narrative potential in that it 
is actualized in different variants of the basic version through the various interpretations 
of the recipient. The medium of the work not only exploits the actions of the actual uni-
verse, but also the factors conditioning the emergence of a story.
Pinar Yoldas’s projects are extremely interesting conceptually and I realize that these 
descriptions are only an introduction to the narrative studies perspective, but I believe 
that they point to the most important issue in this context: affective theory can be an in-
terpretative77 analytical tool for narrative. We should also add that, referencing Knudsen 
and Stage’s typology, we encounter here reciving practices that are partly non-discursive, 
based on affective experiences, changed into their emotional and conceptual interpre-
tations. In the scholars’ categorization, they connect non-representative corporeal and 
discursive spheres, which are diffi cult to set apart.
Biochemical Processes and Experiences: The Narrativity of Physiological 
Spaces
Physiological architecture is one of the most interesting examples of bio art, although 
this categorization is obviously not the only one available. Nathaniel Stern, referencing 
the works of Rafael Lozano-Hemmer, one of the best known artist of this trend, describes 
this kind of artistic endeavour as an engagement with “connective environments”, a re-
lational architecture realized in fl esh space78, which Stern classifi es as interactive art. Re-
lationality, interactivity, processuality, corporeality are without a doubt the most apt labels 
for the projects of Lozano-Hemmer, Philippe Rahm and Jean-Gilles Decosterd (the latter 
a duo creating architectonical spaces that test how the human body reacts to external 
factors; i.e., changes in lighting, climate changes, and changes induced by radiation). 
I would like to discuss the works of these artists in this part of the article79.
I shall focus on one particular work by the duo, the 2002 Hormonorium, but 
fi rst I would like to write about another intriguing project by them, which makes use 
77 I borrow this description from Justyna Tabaszewska, see: J. Tabaszewska, op. cit., pp. 223–226.
78 N. Stern, Interactive Body and Embodiment: The Implicit Body as Performance, Canterbury 2013, p. 180.
79 See: the artist’s offi cial website: http://www.philipperahm.com/data/about.html [access: 13.08.2015].
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of the ability to manipulate meteorological data: the 2007 Split Time Café. This project is 
an attempt at manipulation of time, or more precisely – how our body experiences time 
changes. In one space (the cafe) three temporal perspectives have been constructed. 
The fi rst one corresponds to the natural one, in accordance with the real weather param-
eters. The second one is a staging of a night-time that uses special yellow-tinted glass 
coating that block sunrays, which in turn causes a rapid melatonin secretion increase, 
which is responsible for the need to sleep. The third one has been created with a blue-
tinted glass that allows to pass and emits the radiation that blocks melatonin secre-
tion. Thereby, according to the designers themselves, architecture in question is not only 
a design of space, but also – of time80. Rafael Hartmann Schweizer describes the duo’s 
projects as discovering “a fourth dimension of architecture” 81. Because of that, Split Time 
Café can also be perceived as a project disputing the well-established linear temporal-
ity that ascribes to precise rules of chronology, characteristic not only of the classical 
concepts of narrative. Rahm and Decosterd’s project shows how easy it is to manipulate 
the experience of time and that it is the experience that builds temporality. Linguistic in-
dicators in novels or technical measures in fi lms are supposed to suggest it to us, create 
temporal framework for narrative. Split Time Café does not suggest the experience, but 
rather recreates (and creates) it from our everyday existence. The work is staged, creating 
an affective experience based on the stimulation of hormones, and reactions within the 
human skin and retina. In linguistic narratives, temporality is more or less effectively sug-
gested, but in Rahm and Decosterd’s project it is designed to create a direct experience, 
based on affective and emotional reactions.
I think that the second kind of temporality perfectly fi ts the criteria of narrativity, 
especially when treated as an element of a narrative (i.e., involving purposeful chan-
ges in the state of things and involving sequencing that arises from our perception 
of the passage of time). How we relate these changes to the abovementioned criterion 
of experientiality is crucial. However, when it comes to physiological architecture this 
category gets much more complicated. We are not dealing anymore with a stimulus in 
the shape of an autonomous art work “made” out of a body, which initiates the narrative 
through a stimulation of the cognitive schema. Experientiality here becomes participative, 
performative, and as an “art work” it is a relational project that in itself is based on a sti-
mulation of the affective reactions of our body. Narrativization, which happens because 
of the cognitive processes of mediated consciousness, functions here not only outside of 
the art work, but also in the very project, where participation equals co-creation. Narra-
tivization happens not only in the process of reception, but – as the lines between recep-
tion and co-creation are blurred – also during the act of creation, which indicates more 
than one level of generating narrative. Jill Bennett describes it well when she states, in the 
context of experiencing trauma, that the affective experience can be activated or staged, 
80 Split Time Café: Constructed Temporalities, http://www.philipperahm.com/data/projects/splittimescafe/index. 
html [access: 13.08.2015].
81 R.H. Schweizer, “Decosterd & Rahm - physiologische Architektur”, TEC21, 2004, no. 43, p. 7.
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not only referred through references82. This kind of experiencing and creating of an art 
work clearly discredits the issue of representation, as in this case where the recipient 
does not simply perceive the representation of certain affective situations/events, becau-
se they actually experience it themselves as dynamic activities with a cognitive dimension 
(in reference to Newton’s assumptions). 
I think this will become even more apparent in the context of the Hormonorium pro-
ject, indicating other narrative consequences it can bring. Hormonorium has a very com-
plicated technical specifi cation, so I will only describe it in general, referring interested 
readers to a detailed description by the authors themselves83. As Rahm and Decosterd 
point out: “[The project] is based on the disappearance of the physical boundaries be-
tween space and the organism. ... Going beyond visual and metric mediation, establi-
shing a continuity between the living and the non-living, the Hormonorium opens up to 
the invisible, to electromagnetic and biological determinations”84.
The idea behind the project is the simulation of a high-altitude, mountain clima-
te by manipulating retinal and skin reactions, as well as the manipulation of the pro-
cess of breathing. To do this, the artists have placed a few hundred fluorescent tubes 
in the fl oor, which emit UV-A and UV-B radiation. As a result, the retina is stimula-
ted in such way that it activates the pineal gland, manipulating the level of melatonin 
in the body. This causes a feeling of rapid fatigue, drowsiness, but also an immediate 
agitation, desire, and excitation. Further, the manipulation of the nitrogen levels in the air, 
which is also an aspect of the project, creates a decrease in the oxygen content to a level 
typically encountered at around 3000 meters in altitude. This oxygen defi ciency causes 
disorientation, confusion, but also euphoria. However, what is extremely interesting, after 
10 minutes the body starts to naturally produce erythropoietin, which increases the level 
of red blood cells in the body, causing a rapid oxygenation of the muscles and through 
that a momentary increase in physical effi ciency and stamina85. In time, the experiences 
in the Hormonorium space are identifi ed as emotional states, but at fi rst, they are diffi cult 
to consciously and unambiguously classify, and second, they are initially purely affective 
experiences, independent from our own will. Out of these experiences of changing state: 
drowsiness, fatigue, etc., we create a subjective tale, and a non-verbal narrative, which 
– using Fludernik’s concepts again – does not need to be structured by a plot86.
This kind of participatory, affective experientialism can also be the reason for an at-
tempt at redefi ning the category of focalization, which is a questionable area of narrative 
studies. In an article about the issue of focalization, by evoking the differences in under-
standing this category in classical and post-classical narrative theory, as embodied by 
Genette and Mieke Bal, Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck consider focalization to be a way 
82 J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham 2009, p. 148.
83 See: http://www.philipperahm.com/data/projects/hormonorium/index.html [access: 13.08.2015].
84 Ibidem.
85 Ibidem.
86 M. Fludernik, op. cit., p. 16.
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in which the reader receives access to the narrative worlds of characters and events87. 
If the hero is the focalizer, then the reader perceives narrative (events, other characters, 
space-time) through the lens of their experiences88. Narrative is conducted from the point 
of view of the hero, and the reader is the recipient.
The issue of the place and the function of narrative in literature is considered in 
an interesting way by Magdalena Rembowska-Płuciennik. Her writing is especially impor-
tant to us here, as it can be perceived a crucial starting point for a further renegotiation of 
the defi nition of narrative. Rembowska-Płuciennik introduces the notion of sensual focal-
ization, which she understands as a representation of “sensual experiences as an essen-
tial element of narrative depictions of a character’s consciousness”89, and an intersub-
jective tool that allows the reader to gain access to the inner worlds of the characters90. 
It is thus an “insight into the perceptive experience of the character”91, but with a strong 
assumption that we are talking here about stimulating “sensual experiences of another 
subject by both the narrator and the other characters”92. To recreate in a sensible manner 
the experiences of another subject, we have to apply them to our own experiences from 
real life. Without the person perceiving the certain experience and somehow partaking in 
it, narrative could not happen. Rembowska-Płuciennik correctly notes that: “The highest 
level of closeness between the narrator and the hero happens when you represent psy-
chosomatic experiences, corporeal reactions to emotions and feelings and stimuli from 
the direct-contact senses: touch, smell and taste”93.
 This is an important idea, especially when we want to reference not only literature. 
However, as Płuciennik stresses, it remains a fi gure of “embodied simulation”94, a re-
presentation of experiences and feelings. The narrator can relate to this, and can even 
co-experience it on a transitional basis, but the reader can never feel the narrator’s own 
experience. The textual medium remains the limitation here.
In case of physiological architecture one should attempt to ask what happens 
when the focalizer, hero, recipient and possibly also the narrator are identical, or when 
the focalizer is at the same time the hero, narrator, and recipient of the narrative. This 
is an improbable situation in literature and fi lm95, but we can observe it in relational 
projects. The basic situation is as following: the recipient, who enters the project space, 
constantly perceives everything that belongs to the universe in question, and takes part 
in it. The recipient becomes the hero of the world, the space, as their experience is one 
87 L. Herman, B. Vervaeck, “Focalization between Classical and Postclassical Narratology”, in: The Dynamicsof 
Narrative Form: Studies in Anglo-American Narratology, ed. J. Pier, Berlin 2004, p. 117.
88 Ibidem.
89 M. Rembowska-Płuciennik, op. cit. p. 189.
90 Ibidem.
91 Ibidem, p. 191.
92 Ibidem, p. 190.
93 Ibidem, p. 195.
94 Ibidem, p. 198.
95 It possible in hypertext fi ction, but I cannot imagine such a situation in full in traditional fi ction. It also seems 
impossible that someone could be placed in all these roles at the same time in a movie.
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of the elements of the project, but at the same time as they perceive the whole artistic 
act they are its recipients. They feel their own experience as the hero and the subjective 
narrator, and they participate as a “narrative agent” in the story. Narrative is created 
here from the hero and the recipient levels at the same time, and the latter receives 
– in a direct manner – access to a narrative created from the character’s own perspective 
(which follows the previously mentioned defi nition of focalization by Herman and Verva-
eck). Thus, when referencing Rembowska-Płuciennik, it is important to stress that in such 
a situation the inner states belong to the hero of the event, and not to another subject 
(esp. in the context of focalization). They are not represented or simulated, but psycho-
somatically experiences are created in statu nascendi. However, it is diffi cult to imagine 
a narrative situation in literature or any other medium based on sign representation that 
would move beyond simulation. We are not discussing an intersubjective experience 
here, but rather an intra-subjective one, that gives sense to its own experiences. Such 
a bodily tale is not reproduced, reconstructed, or supplemented with respect to the inclu-
ded elements; it is created, produced, and its basic matter is (as mentioned by Newton) 
a deliberate change in sensation or mood; it is a dynamic activity strongly binding this 
affective story to narrative. The resulting narrative would be the one that is not “projected 
by references”, it does not reconstruct existing tropes or text/media signs or the process 
of replenishing undefi ned places. This narrative is activated, stimulated, and initiated not 
by conventional elements traditionally attributed to narrative, but by a directly-induced, 
performative experience (esp. as Bennett defi nes it).
Focalization redefi ned in such a way seems like an extremely interesting challenge 
for narrative theory, and I do not think that it can be easily rejected as something beyond 
the framework of this category. Thus, I would like to propose an affective focalization, 
in contrast to Rembowska-Płuciennik’s “sensual focalization”, to show that it is not only 
an attempt to represent experience, but rather an experience itself, often not fully depen-
dent on our consciousness. This category also stresses the fact that functions interweave 
with each other – in case of mainly the recipient and the hero of the narrative – and 
emphasise sensual, corporeal experientiality as the basis of functioning for each one.
Other narrative studies’ terms could also go through analogous redefi nition, ho-
wever, for this article I have chosen the ones that I think prove that using affectivity 
in narrative studies is possible even for classical concepts, and representationism is not 
an intransgressible perspective here, but rather one that can be negotiated. 
Further Perspectives: Post-anthropocentric Narrativity?
Applying affect theory to narrative studies can bring numerous interesting theoretical 
solutions to narratology and create narrative fi elds capable of encompassing redefi ned 
tools and categories. The affective turn itself is also connected to a number of tendencies 
in modern humanities, and although we do not have space in this text for discussing 
them, I believe that in time they will create a new direction for narratology. 
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The most important issues concern the new perception of materiality and the concept 
of non-human actors96. An example of a concept that joins both areas of refl ection are 
Jane Bennett’s vibrant matter theory97 and Timothy Morton’s hyperobject theory98. Both 
situate human beings in a different sphere than the one that up until now has been com-
fortable (esp. concerning the line of infl uences from nature, changes in energy fl ow, and 
changes in matter that are of enormous political and cultural importance). These shifts in 
approach create more than just amendment to human worlds. They are important also 
when we think of humanity’s history. These concepts also show the infl uence of non-hu-
man factors (e.g., the infl uence of strains of bacteria in the previously mentioned project 
by Anna Dumitriu).
Such an “embodied” or even post-anthropocentric narratology has so far remained 
in the area of thought experiment, but we should stress that this turn would not only con-
stitute of an attempt to answer the question of whether animals create their own narra-
tives, and if so, how do they do so, but also what they are and how they are constructed. 
This would also open a space for stories created not only by humans, but also agents 
occuring outside of human control and consciousness and for non-human factors infl u-
encing the creation of narratives, stories, culturally-important histories. As Michael Tollan 
writes: “A narrative is a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events, typically 
involving, as the experiencing agonist, humans or quasi-humans, or other sentient be-
ings, from whose experience we humans can »learn«”99.
Post-anthropocentrism is not an idle call to a connection with nature, but an at-
tempt to move past the limits of our perception – both biological and cultural. Usually, 
this comes down to an aporia. For, we cannot realise post-anthropocentrism outside 
of a post-anthropocentric perspective. However, even if this attempt might fail, I believe 
that the necessity to redefi ne the key categories and enlarge narrative theory in a less 
obvious direction should prove extremely valuable for a narratology oriented towards, 
among others, the sphere of corporeality.
96 This term, often used in the humanities, references the actor-network theory (ANT) by Bruno Latour and, 
for example, Andrew Pickering or Levi Bryant, who considers the place of things and inamiate objects in (non)
human world. The concept of non-human actors is one of the essential categories examined in the context 
of posthumanistic vision of the world, in fi elds such as animal studies, media studies or object oriented philoso-
phy and in already mentioned new materialism, which offer innovative for humanisties perspective of matter, 
inspired by the achievements of science, and above all physics. See: B. Latour, Splatając na nowo to, co społecz-
ne. Wprowadzenie do teorii aktora-sieci, Kraków 2010, A. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice. Time, Agency and 
Science, Chicago 1996, L.R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, Open Humanities Press 2011.
97 J. Bennett, op. cit., p. xi.
98 T. Morton, Hyperobjects. Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World, Minneapolis 2013.
99 M. Tollan, Narrative: A Critical Linguistic Introduction, London 2001, p. 8.
